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Rough Waters for the Ratings Companies:
Should the Securities Ratings Companies Be
Held Liable for Investor Reliance in the Wake
of the Real Estate Meltdown of 2007-2008?
KRISTOFOR W. NELSONt
I. INTRODUCTION
The real estate downturn in 2007 created a drastic effect on US
homeowners, lending institutions, and investors.' The fall of the housing
market began a series of events which Alan Greenspan, the former chair-
man of the Federal Reserve, described as a "once in a century credit
tsunami."2 In fact as of March 2009, one out of every eight residential
mortgages in the United States was at least one payment behind or
already in foreclosure.' A real estate market that once demonstrated
unprecedented growth and appreciation rates from 2001 to 2005 began
to show signs of slowing as early as 2005.4 Newspaper and media stories
have been written discussing the effect of the market downturn on
homeowners, the housing industry, stock market, lending institutions,
and the overall economy.5 This note considers whether securities ratings
companies, such as Standard & Poor's, Fitch, and Moody's, should be
held liable to the investors of residential mortgage backed securities
t J.D. May 2009 University of Miami School of Law.
1. See Chris Isidore, It's Official: Recession Since Dec. '07, CNNMoNEY.COM, Dec. 1, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com2008/12/Ollnews/economy/recessionlindex.htm; Daniel Gross, The S&P
500's Bubble Trouble, NEWSWEEK.COM, July 10, 2008, http://www.newsweek.comid/145406;
James Temple, He's Intent on Reviving Bayview, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 2008, at D1.
2. The Financial Crisis and the Role Of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. at 15 (2008) [hereinafter Role of Regulators
Hearing] (Testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Federal Reserve), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081024163819.pdf.
3. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Continue
to Climb in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (May 28, 2009), available at http://www.
mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/6903 I.htm.
4. Michael Fratatoni, Where are House Prices Headed, MORTGAGE BANKING at 32 (Jan. 1,
2006).
5. See, e.g., Jeannine Aversa, Economy Contracts At A 5.7 Pct Pace in 1st Quarter; Analysts
Believe Economy Doing Better Now, YAHOO!FINANCE, May 29, 2009, http://finance.yahoo.com/
news/US-economy-sinks-at-a-57-apf-15383307.html, (discussing the US economy in the longest
recession since World War II and the effect on investors, lending institutions and consumers);
David Bodamer, Quesy Rider, RETAIL TRAFFIC, December 1, 2005, at 18; Macroeconomic
Developments, Households and Enterprises, NORGES BANK FIN. STABILITY, MAY 1, 2005, at 15;
Lorraine Mirabella, Regions Realty Market Cooling Home Sales Decline, Price Growth Slows in
April in Key Period, BALT. SUN, May 11, 2006 at IA.
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(also referred to as "RMBS"). These investors relied on the ratings of
the securities issued by the ratings companies only to have the value of
those securities decrease significantly due to real estate market downturn
and subsequent re-rating of those securities by the ratings companies.
The focus of this analysis will be on the liability of the securities ratings
companies under both contract and tort theories. Specifically, potential
liability will be analyzed under the doctrine of promissory estoppel in
contracts and under an extension of negligence and products liability
theories in torts.6 Accordingly, the stance of this article is speculative
and normative rather than descriptive of accepted views on the current
state of the law. In order to properly determine whether liability under
these theories should exist, it is necessary to understand the relationship
between investors and the ratings companies. Furthermore, it is impor-
tant to understand the real estate market, the market for RMBS, and the
underlying market conditions that led to the investors' losses and poten-
tial liability of the ratings companies.
II. THE PROBLEM: WHAT HAPPENED IN THE REAL ESTATE
MARKET MELTDOWN OF 2006-2008
The overall effects of the real estate market downturn, or
"meltdown" as it has been called, are still being determined.7 As the rate
of housing foreclosures continue to rise, many lending institutions have
announced large write-downs of assets related directly to the housing
market, resulting in falling stock prices and business valuations.8 Other
leaders in the real estate mortgage market have not survived, either hav-
ing been acquired by a competitor, taken over by the government, or
6. There are obviously other theories and doctrines that could also be considered, such as
misrepresentation, additional liability to third party beneficiaries under contract law and fraud
under both tort and contract law. The extension of products liability to the ratings companies is an
expansion of the theory developed by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren's application of
products liability to consumer financial products. See Barr-Gill and Warren infra note 176; see
also discussion infra p. 36.
7. Patrice Hill, Page One Broken Foundations: The Housing Market, Blame Abounds for
Housing Bust Easy Money, Greed a Toxic Mix, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A01; Daniel
McGinn, With Lust in Our Hearts, NEWSWEEK , January 14, 2008, at 50. The current economic
recession which began in the aftermath of the housing downturn, is now being referred to as "The
Great Recession." Chris Isidore, The Great Recession: Economists generally agree this is the
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, but they say despite pain, another
depression isn't likely., CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 25, 2009, http://money.cnn.com2009/03/25/
news/economy/depression.comparisons/.
8. See Role of Regulators Hearing, supra note 2 at 16-20 (testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan,
Former Chairman, Federal Reserve); How Subprime Started in Orange California, TMC.NET, Jan.
2, 2008, http://www.tmc.net.com. (referencing "Top U.S. Financial Firms have announced more
than $80 billion in write downs on mortgage backed securities" with an additional $33.6 billion
forecast to be announced).
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declared bankruptcy.9 In light of this, the lending institutions that
remained tightened credit guidelines making it more difficult for bor-
rowers to obtain credit.10 One major effect the tightening credit guide-
lines is that borrowers who previously would have been able to borrow
more money or refinance their loans, are now unable to do so.I 1 As a
result, borrowers in risk of default and unable to refinance subsequently
defaulted on their loans, while others no longer have access to funds that
could be used to expand the economy. 2 By December 2007, the real
estate market meltdown helped push the U.S. economy into the longest
economic recession since World War II."3 To help avoid a potential eco-
nomic recession, the Federal Reserve Bank lowered short-term US inter-
est rates to almost zero from 2007 to 2008.14 In December 2007, the
Federal Reserve issued a statement that it was more concerned with the
current risk of an economic recession than the potential inflationary risk
caused by lowering short-term interest rates.
15
In the wake of this economic uncertainty and meltdown of the real
estate market, the potential causes are being unraveled and discussed.
Legislators held hearings to discuss the causes of what now seems to be
9. Kate Berry, A Systematic Risk Averted in Servicing?, AM. BANKER, Jan. 14, 2008,
Mortgages at 1; Karen Sibayan, ASR Looks Back at 2007, ASSET SECURrmZATION REP., (Jan. 14,
2008).
10. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at
the Economic Club of New York, New York (Oct. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Bernanke, Club of New
York], available at http://www.bis.org/review/r081016a.pdf; Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Stamp Lecture, London School of Economics
(Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/
20090113_Bernanke.pdf; Becky Yarak, Countrywide Tightens Loan Rules, CHI. TRIB., August 24,
2007, at 3.
11. Bernanke, Club of New York, supra note 10; The Secretary-General of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Financial Markets Highlights November
2007, FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, ISSN 0378-651 X at 11 (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter Secretary-
General of OECD, Nov. 2007], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/18/39654572.pdf.
For a discussion and analysis regarding the effect of the credit market tightening in debtor-in-
possession bankruptcy loans see Jarrod B. Martin, et al., Free Falling With a Parachute That May
Not Open: Debtor-In-Possession Financing in the Wake of the Great Recession, 63 U. MIAMI L.
REV. * (2009) (discussing alternative sources of DIP financing in the wake of the credit crisis).
12. Bernanke, Club of New York , supra note 10; Laura Smitherman, Home Loan Reforms
Planned O'Malley Seeks Changes To Address Foreclosure Threat, BALT. SUN, Jan. 13, 2008, at
Al.
13. Isidore, supra note 7. See 2009 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT at 96, available at
http://www.nber.org/erp/2009-erp.pdf.
14. Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Cuts Rates Near Zero to Battle Slump-Historic Move Boosts Stocks
as Consumer Prices, Housing Starts Drop Sharply; Obama Calls for Government Spending
Program, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at Al.
15. Peter G. Gosselin, Fed Interest-Rate Cut a Wall Street Letdown Stocks Dive Quarter
Point Not Seen as Dramatic Enough by Many Analysts, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at Cl;
Maura Reynolds, The Economy, Fed Disappoints the Street, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at 1.
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a gross over-valuation of real estate property across the United States. 6
Numerous news articles and commentaries attributed the blame to all
market participants. 17 Some blame the greed of the speculative real
estate investors who signed purchase contracts on newly constructed
homes or purchased homes with the intention to take advantage of the
rapidly increasing housing prices and resell the home without ever living
in it, a practice known as "flipping."' 8 Others blame the lending institu-
tions for loosening their underwriting standards and being overly aggres-
sive in extending credit to borrowers.' 9 While some blame the loan
originators who, with or without the borrowers knowledge, may have
defrauded the institutions into believing the loans met the required credit
quality standards which actually did not.20 Others have wondered if the
legislators and regulators failed to properly monitor the real estate mar-
ket and failed to use their powers to prevent this current meltdown.2'
Others still have properly observed that the issue of the consumer credit
meltdown may not be within the purview of the state offices to regulate
via consumer protection laws on national banks and other federally
chartered institutions, because the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 22 largely supported the widely criticized
16. See The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (testimony of Daniel Mudd,
Former CEO, Fannie Mae); Federal Response to the Housing and Financial Crisis: Hearing
Before S. Budget Comm., 111 th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. Cong.
Budget Office).
17. Gail Marksjarvis, Could Mortgage Problems Have Been Prevented by Less Greed?, Prrr.
POsT-GAzErra, Jan. 13, 2008, at G7; Who's To Blame: Washington or Wall Street?, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 30, 2009, at 30 [hereinafter Who's To Blame?].
18. Ada Focer, Flip... Flip... Flip... Flop: Mortgage Fraud and Property "Flipping" Skew
Low-Lcome Housing Markets, SHELTERFORCE, Sept. 2000, at 10, available at http://www.nhi.org/
online/issues/113/focer.html.
19. Marksjarvis, supra note 17.
20. Christofor L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2189
(2007) (recognizing that loan originators assign predatory loans through a series of deft
transactions to avoid liability); Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, The
Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment
Penalties and Balloon Payments 12-20 (Univ. N.C. Kenan-Flagler Business School, Working
Paper, 2005), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd-_I 503-Lax.
pdf, (observing that subprime mortgage borrowers tend to be less educated, less sophisticated and
less prepared than prime mortgage borrowers).
21. Ted Frank, Prime Target, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2007, at A15 (discussing the subprime
meltdown and state legislators moves to impose unlimited liability on purchases of mortgages
despite for any violation of law by the loan originators, such as the 2002 Georgia Fair Lending
Act); Who's To Blame?, supra note 17. But see Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,264 (OCC, Aug. 5, 2003) (discussing Georgia's legislative attempt to prevent predatory
lending practices within its state, and the OCC's adoption of regulations to effectively limit the
application of state laws to national banks).
22. 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
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federal conflict preemption of state regulatory efforts.2 3
III. THE PARTIES IMPACTED BY INACTION AND INDECISION-
WHO'S AFFECTED, ALL TO BLAME?
As mentioned above, the current market downturn had a direct or
indirect effect on almost every party involved with the US economy. 4
As recently as 2005, subprime mortgages and home equity loans securi-
tizations totaled a staggering $525.7 billion.25 Approximately 80 percent
of subprime mortgages were securitized, adjustable rate mortgages.26 As
of March 2009, almost half of the subprime adjustable rate mortgages
are either at least one payment past due in their payments or in foreclo-
sure. 27 The real estate downturn greatly effected homeowners, hedge
funds, investors, and lenders. 8 Investors in lending institutions and real
estate secured investments all are adversely affected as the value of
these investments decreased rapidly in this market environment.2 9 To
properly analyze the investors' legal recourse against the ratings compa-
23. See, e.g., Chad D. Ehrenkranz, Can a Bank Have Its Cake and Eat It Too? Why Watters v.
Wachovia Wrongly Infers Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 16 U. MIAMI Bus. L.
REV. 139 (2008); Keith R. Fisher, Toward a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank
Act Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 981 (2006)
(discussing the negative aspects of the OCC rulings and preemption); Howell E. Jackson & Stacy
A. Anderson, Can States Tax National Banks To Educate Consumers About Predatory Lending
Practices?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'x 831, 833-34 (2007) (noting that the tension between a
state law's attempt to protect its citizens and federally charted lending institutions has been
"resolved largely in favor of federal preemption, at least with respect to state laws purporting to
regulate the manner in which national banks and other federal instrumentalities extend credit to
their customers" by the Supreme Court's decision in Watters).
24. The Secretary-General of the OECD, Financial Market Highlights - May 2008:
The Recent Financial Market Turmoil, Contagion Risks and Policy Responses, FINANCIAL
MARKET TRENDS, ISSN 1995-2864 at 12 (May 2008) [hereinafter Secretary-General of the
OECD, May 2008], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/51/40850026.pdf; Testimony
Concerning Recent Events in the Credit and Mortgage Markets and Possible Implications for U.S.
Consumers and the Global Economy Before the H. Fin. Serv. Comm., 110th Cong. at 25 (Sept. 5,
2007) [hereinafter Sirri, Sept.2007 Congr. Testimony] (Testimony of Erik R. Sirri, Dir., Div. of
Mkt. Reg., SEC) available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110-
house-hearings&docid=F:39537.pdf.; Erik R. Sirri, Dir., Div. of Mkt. Reg., SEC, Remarks Before
the AICPA/FMD National Conference on the Securities Industry (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter
Sirri, Remarks Before AICPA/FMD] available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spchlI
2807ers.htm. See Bemanke, Club of New York, supra note 10.
25. See S&P, The Subprime Market 7 (June 17, 2005) (the sum of the home equity and sub-
prime loans).
26. Senator Chris Dodd, Create, Sustain, Preserve, and Protect the American Dream of Home
Ownership, February 7, 2007, http://dodd.senate.gov/?q=node/373 1.
27. Mortgage Defaults, Foreclosures Spreading, MSNBC.com, May 28, 2009, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/29528856/.
28. Secretary-General of OECD, Nov. 2007, supra note 11 at 17-19.
29. See id.
2009l 1181
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nies, a cursory discussion in the securitization of real estate backed
securities is necessary.
IV. THE DEVIL You KNOW-UNDERSTANDING SECURITIZATION OF
REAL ESTATE BACKED SECURITIES AND THE RISE OF THE
SUB PRIME MARKET
The real estate backed securities market in the US has exploded
into a multi-trillion dollar market over the last thirty years. 30 In the
1970s, large financial institutions lenders began to pool residential real
estate mortgages together and transfer the assets into a trust, usually held
by a third party.3" The third party trustee often sold shares of the trust to
large institutional investors who purchased the shares in return for the
cash flow generated from the underlying mortgages.3" This type of trans-
action is commonly referred to as securitization.33 Almost all types of
loans could be securitized, such as residential real estate loans, commer-
cial loans, car loans, student loans, and even credit card receivables. 34
However, this commentary focuses on RMBS.35
Lending institutions benefited from selling RMBS in several ways.
The sale of the long term cash flow generated by the RMBS provided
the lending institutions immediate capital to expand, meet regulatory
reserve requirements, and satisfy shareholder profitability budgets. 36 By
transferring the mortgages into a third party trust, the lending institutions
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION 1:2 (Adam Ford ed., 2002).
32. Charles M. Sivesind, Mortgage-Backed Securities: The Revolution in Real Estate
Finance, in HOUSING AND THE NEW FINANCIAL MARKETS 311, 312-13 (Richard L. Florida ed.,
1986); Joint Release, Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC),
Federal Reserve System (FRS) Board of Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), Department of the Treasury: Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), Interagency Guidance
on Asset Securitization Activities, 1999 OFIA Lexis 7, at 2 (Dec. 13, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Joint
Statement].
33. 1999 Joint Statement, supra note 32. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 142 (1994).
34. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization Evolution Current Issues
and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1376 (1991); David J. Weiner, Comment, Assignee
Liability in the State of Predatory Lending Laws: How Uncapped Punitive Damages Threaten the
Secondary Mortgage Market, 55 Emory L.J. 535, 550 (2006).
35. "A typical residential mortgage-backed securitization (RMBS) involves the following key
parties: (1) the borrower, who is obligated to repay the mortgage; (2) the mortgage broker or
lender (the "originator"); (3) the entity which purchases the loans from the originator and then
sells the security instrument (the "issuer"); (4) the investment bankers, who structure, underwrite,
and sell the securities; (5) the rating agencies, who are responsible for assigning a credit rating; (6)
a credit enhancer, who guarantees that there will be a source of funds available for payments as
they b.come due on the securities; and (7) a servicer, who collects and distributes the principal and
interest payments." Weiner supra note 34.
36. See Schwarcz, supra note 26; 1999 Joint Statement, supra note 32.
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no longer carried the underlying mortgages on their balance sheets.37
This transfer afforded lending institutions an additional method to man-
age loan concentration levels on their balance sheets.38
By investing in the RMBS, investors were able to further diversify
their investment portfolio to include what seemed to be a relatively
secure income generating investment.39 The investments seemed secure
because, in addition to the diversification provided by the pooling of a
large number of mortgages, initially RMBS primarily consisted of mort-
gages to high credit quality borrowers, often referred to as "prime mort-
gages" sold by large financial institutions to large institutional
investors. 40 Investors, through market demand, helped direct the under-
writing criteria and pricing for the types of mortgages that would be
included in the securitizations.4 1
However, in the 1990s, lenders began to pool and securitize higher
risk mortgages, referred to as "subprime mortgages. '42 Subprime mort-
gages are loans to borrowers who, for a variety of reasons, are consid-
ered to be at a higher risk of default than prime mortgages.43 These
reasons include, but are not limited to: prior bankruptcies, lower than
average credit scores, unverifiable income, higher debt to income ratios,
and higher loan to value ratios.4 Historically, a disproportionate amount
of subprime borrowers have consisted of lower income classes and the
elderly. 45 The overrepresentation of these vulnerable classes raises con-
cerns of predatory practices within the subprime lending markets.46
While numerous articles and commentaries have been written addressing
who should be liable to the borrowers who fell victim to predatory lend-
ing practices, this article does not address that issue focusing instead on
potential liability to investors in RMBS.4 7
37. 1999 Joint Statement, supra note 32.
38. See id.
39. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, at 2041 (2007); Micheal H. Schill, Uniformity or
Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing
Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL L. REv. 1261 (1991).
40. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. A. Brooke Overby, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post Katrina New Orleans, 48 B.C. L. REv.
851, 901-906. (2007) (describing the emergence of subprime loan growth, securitization of
subprime loans, and definition of "subprime" loans).
43. Joint Release, OCC, FRS, OTS, Expanded Guidance for the Subprime Lending
Programs,2001 FDIC Interp. Ltr. Lexis 9 at 7 (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Expanded
Guidance]; Overby, supra note 42 at 898-99.
44. 2001 Expanded Guidance, supra note 43; Overby, supra note 42 at 898-99.
45. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2041; Overby, supra note 42 at 898-99.
46. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2041; Overby, supra note 42 at 898-99.
47. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
2009] 1183
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Prior to the 1990s there was no viable market in which investors
would purchase the subprime collateralized securities. 48 Advances in
technology, however, made it possible to attempt to estimate and price
the risk of subprime home loan pools. 49 In order for investors to be com-
fortable in purchasing shares collateralized by residential mortgages, a
tranche system was created for these securities.50 In this tranche system,
various classes of securities were created in which senior classes of
securities received credit support from junior, subordinated classes of
securities sold by the same issuer.5" Under the tranche system, the inves-
tor who held the most senior position of the security would be repaid
first until that investor was paid in full. Then the owner of the next
senior tranche would be repaid.52 This method of repayment would con-
tinue until the entire debt to investors was repaid.53 The investors in the
most senior tranche had the benefit of knowing they would be repaid
first by the issuer of the RMBS. Additionally, in the case of default of
the mortgage and liquidation of the underlying property(ies), the senior
tranche investors would be repaid first with any remaining funds passed
to the junior tranches in order of their seniority. 4 This default repay-
ment structure is by virtue of the contractual subordination language in
instrument which all the securities were issued.55 Some lenders contin-
ued to service the mortgages56 and held the most junior tranches of the
underlying debt on their balance sheets." This provided investors some
assurance that lenders were not just passing off undesirable loans to
investors, as the lenders also had an economic incentive for the loans to
be repaid because they retained a first loss position in the pool of mort-
gages subject to the RMBS transaction.58 To further address investor
concerns over the risk of subprime mortgage pools, many lenders also
offered recourse to investors which required the lenders to take back any
nonperforming mortgages in the pool and substitute them with perform-
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002); Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at
2041; Overby, supra note 42 at 898-99.
48. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2045.
49. Id.; Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in
the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL L. REv. 1261, 1268-72
(1991).
50. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2046-50; Schill, supra note 49.
51. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2046-50; Schill, supra note 49.
52. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2046-50; Schill, supra note 49.
53. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2046-50; Schill, supra note 49.
54. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2046-50; Schill, supra note 49.
55. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2046-50; Schill, supra note 49.
56. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2063 ("Some securitization deals require lenders to
retain loan servicing rights.").
57. Id. at 2046-67.
58. See id. at 2063.
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ing mortgages held by the lending institutions. 59 Additionally, some
lenders even provided credit enhancement insurance to help investors
become comfortable in purchasing securities collateralized by sub prime
mortgages.6°
Although some investors purchased RMBS directly from a third
party trust in a private transaction, most investors purchased the RMBS
in a public market.6' The investors in a public primary and secondary
market (i.e. sold by others after initial offering) often rely on the invest-
ment ratings given by the ratings companies in determining the relative
quality and underlying risk of the security.62 The securities ratings com-
panies that issue the ratings are supposed to be impartial third parties
that conduct an analysis of the security and modeling of the market in
order to determine the risk of loss of investing in the security.6 3 Many
investors rely on the ratings because they lack the time or the informa-
tion to conduct a thorough investigation on their own, especially in con-
stantly changing markets.64 The higher the security is rated by the
companies, presumably, the less risk of loss on the investment. 65 The
senior securities backed by the same collateral pool will have higher
values than the junior securities that provide credit support. 66 The high-
est rating given by S&P is AAA, which is considered to be very low
risk.6 7 By comparison, US Treasury Bonds usually carry AAA ratings.68
Notably, the most senior tranches of many sub prime RMBS were issued
AAA ratings during the real estate market boom from 1998-2006.69
59. Id. at 2062.
60. Id. at 2047-48. AIG the largest provider of credit enhancement insurance continues to
teeter on the verge of bankruptcy for its exposure to this type of insurance. At the time of this
writing, federal government twice injected AIG with emergency funds in order to avoid
insolvency. David Ellis, US Takes Another Crack at AIG Rescue, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/02/news.companies/aig/index.htm.
61. SECURMEs EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Final Rule: Asset Backed Securities, Release No.
33-8518, Dec. 22, 2004, available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/33-8518.htm [hereinafter Final
Rule: Asset Backed Securities].
62. See Standard & Poor's, Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions, June 3,
2009, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/eu/page.article/2,1,4,0,
1204847187221 .html.
63. See id.
64. See e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2070-72.
65. Standard & Poor's, supra note 62. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2054.
66. Kenneth Temkin et al., Subprime Markets, the Role of GSEs, and Risk-Based Pricing,
HUD OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH (Mar. 2002) available at http://www.
huduser.org/Publications/pdf/subprime.pdf.
67. Standard & Poor's, supra note 62.
68. Kathleen M. Howley, Rating Subprime Investment Grade Made 'Joke' of Credit Experts,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
ajdL7eUHeUro.
69. Sirri, Sept.2007 Congr. Testimony, supra note 24; Sirri, Remarks Before AICPA/FMD,
supra note 24; Engel & McCoy, supra note 39; Howley, supra note 68.
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Understandably, an investor relying on the rating to determine the
investment risk would perceive the risk of investing in the most senior
tranche of a sub prime RMBS similar to that of investing in the United
States Government issued treasuries.70 In fact, during the recent real
estate market boom, S&P not only rated the most senior tranche of sub
prime RMBS AAA, but also issued upgrades to many of the junior
tranches that were initially given lower ratings. 7' This signaled to inves-
tors, who rely on the ratings to assess their investment risk, that even the
junior tranches of the sub prime RMBS were of investment grade quality
similar to the quality of investing in the bonds of many Fortune 500
companies.72
V. WHO SHOULD BE ACCOUNTABLE? EXAMINING THE
FACTS SURROUNDING POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF
THE RATINGS COMPANIES
The current real estate downturn created an environment in which
many of the subprime mortgages that secured the RMBS began to
default or experience higher risk of default.73 By early 2005, the govern-
ment, media, and economists began to express concern that a potential
real estate market bubble loomed due to inflated real estate prices and
increasing mortgage defaults. 74 Yet, ratings companies' upgrades of sub-
prime RMBS continued to surpass the downgrades.75 In fact, the ratings
companies issued statements praising their overly conservative view of
the risk of the subprime RMBS as late as 2006.76 By mid-2007, how-
ever, many of the previously rated investment grade securities were
downgraded by the same ratings companies, with many being rated
70. See Sirri, Sept.2007 Congr. Testimony, surpa note 24; Sirri, Remarks Before A1CPA/
FMD, supra note 24; see also Standard & Poor's, supra note 62.
71. See Standard & Poor's, Rating Transitions 2004: U.S. RMBS Stellar Performance
Continues to Set Records, Jan. 21, 2005, available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/sp/
RatingTran21JanO5.pdf [hereinafter S&P, Ratings Transitions 2004]; Standard & Poor's,
Rating Transitions 2005: U.S. RMBS Volume and Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, Jan.
24, 2006, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.comportal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/3, 1,1,0,
1139588867949.html [hereinafter S&P, Ratings Transitions 2005]; Standard &Poor's, Transition
Study: U.S. RMBS Upgrades Are Down and Downgrades Are Up in 2006, Jan. 26, 2007, available
at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/subprime-upgrades-downgrades-01
2 607.
pdf [hereinafter S&P, Transition Study].
72. Mark Adelson et al., Subprime Surprise... Not!, NOMURA FIXED I.cOME RESEARCH Apr.
18, 2007, available at http:/www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/July/20070726/OP-12881OP-
1288 2I .pdf.
73. Id. See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, supra note 3.
74. Adelson et al., supra note 72.
75. Id.
76. S&P, Rating Transitions 2004, supra note 71; S&P, Rating Transitions 2005, supra note
71; S&P, Transition Study: supra note 71.
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below investment grade also known as "junk."7 7 On July 10th, 2007,
S&P downgraded 562 cases of RMBS securities totaling 6.39 billion
dollars.78 Notably, this mass downgrade occurred the same day an inter-
agency report by the FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve, Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)
issued a joint statement clarifying and expanding on two previous joint
statements issued in 1999 and 2001 by the OCC, Federal Reserve,
FDIC, and the OTS regarding the government's concern of the risks
associated with subprime mortgage lending. 79  The government
expressed a concern in all three joint statements that lenders may not be
fully assessing or protecting against the risks involved in making the
subprime loans.8 ° The concerns of the government regulators focused on
lack of consumer understanding, potential predatory lending, rapidly
increasing interest rates, lenders' inability to assess the risks of granting
the loan, and the risks to the lenders in the face of large defaults. 8' Fur-
thermore, the ratings companies, like the government regulatory agen-
cies, are supposed to be impartial third parties that objectively assess the
risks of the securities.82 The ratings companies arguably should have
been aware of the government agencies' concerns and should have taken
those factors identified by the government agencies into consideration
during their own analysis of rating the companies. Instead, a majority of
the ratings companies' risk assessment of the underlying collateral
focused on proper documentation of the loan and legal compliance of
the originator rather than an assessment of the stability and projections
77. Howley, supra note 68.
78. Alistair Barr, S&P Cuts $6.39 Bin in Mortgage-Backed Securities, MARKETWATCH.COM,
July 12, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sp-cuts-639-billion-in-mortgage-backed-
securities.
79. Statement on Subprime Lending, 72 FR 37569 (July 10, 2007) (Department of the
Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve System (FRS) Board of
Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Department of the Treasury: Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)); Agencies Issue
Guidance on Asset Securitization Activities; Consider Regulatory Restrictions, 1999 OFIA Lexis
7 (Dec. 13, 1999) (Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC),
Federal Reserve System (FRS) Board of Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), Department of the Treasury: Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)); Guidance Issued in
Subprime Lending (Mar. 1, 1999) (Department of the Treasury: Office of the Comptroller of
Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve System (FRS) Board of Governors, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), Department of the Treasury: Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)); 2001
Expanded Guidance, supra note 43.
80. Statement on Subprime Lending, supra note 79; Agencies Issue Guidance on Asset
Securitization Activities, supra note 79; 1999 Guidance Issued in Subprime Lending, supra note
79; 2001 Expanded Guidance, supra note 43.
81. Statement on Subprime Lending, supra note 79; Agencies Issue Guidance on Asset
Securitization Activities, supra note 79; 1999 Guidance Issued in Subprime Lending, supra note
79; 2001 Expanded Guidance, supra note 43.
82. See Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, supra note 62.
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of the real estate market, and interest rate shock risk.83 The timing of the
massive downgrade in July 2007-the same day as the release of the
joint agency statement-could be seen as more of a reaction to the state-
ment issued by the government than the ratings companies' own inde-
pendent risk analysis.84 Not surprisingly, in response to the S&P's
announcement of the downgrades in July 2007, one analyst openly ques-
tioned why the downgrades were not issued months in advance.8 5 As a
result of the downgrades, many of the securities' value dropped and
investors lost millions.86 Securities that were once highly liquid and in
high demand, seemingly overnight had lost their marketability.87 Many
investors and market observers began to question how the ratings issued
by "objective" ratings companies could have been so inaccurate in their
assessment of default risk.88
VI. THEORIES OF RECOVERY FOR INVESTORS WHO PRESENTLY
HAVE NONE: SHOULD THEY BE EXTENDED TO
MAKE INVESTORS WHOLE?
Investors who purchased the highly rated RMBS did so under the
belief that the security they were purchasing was of high quality and had
a low risk of default.89 As a result, the purchase prices of the securities
were higher than those of similar income producing securities with
lower ratings.9" Once the ratings companies downgraded the RMBS,
investors not only saw the value of their investments drop drastically
overnight, but the downgrade signaled to investors that their seemingly
low risk investments were now, in fact, considered a high default risk.9'
This situation caused market observers and investors to question the reli-
ability of the ratings generated by the ratings companies. 92 Further, some
investors adversely affected by their reliance on the ratings also sought
government aid to recoup the losses they incurred as a result of their
reliance on the investment ratings generated by the ratings companies. 93
83. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2068.
84. See, e.g., Howley, supra note 68; Statement on Subprime Lending, supra note 79.
85. Howley, supra note 68.
86. Secretary-General of OECD, Nov. 2007, supra note 11.
87. Howley, supra note 68.
88. Adelson et. al., supra note 72; Gretchen Morgenson, Will Other Mortgage Dominoes
Fall?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2007, at Cl.
89. See Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, supra note 62
90. See Secretary-General of OECD, Nov. 2007, supra note 11; see also Standard & Poor's
Ratings Definitions, supra note 62.
91. Secretary-General of OECD, Nov. 2007, supra note 11; See also Standard & Poor's
Ratings Definitions, supra note 62.
92. Adelson et. al., supra note 72; Morgenson, supra note 88 at CI.
93. See The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2007)
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Next, the SEC and the States of New York and Ohio began investigating
the ratings companies' practices of rating the RMBS. 94 Additionally, a
large New York Pension Fund, a large holder of RMBS in its portfolio,
sued the ratings companies in an attempt to recover its losses as a result
of its reliance on the ratings.95
A. Ratings Companies Strike Back!
To date, the ratings companies have successfully avoided class
action liability for their ratings.96 The ratings companies have supplied
compelling legal and policy arguments that support their contention and
belief that they should not be held liable for investors' losses. First, the
ratings companies will likely rely on legal precedent and claim that their
ratings are protected under the First Amendment. 97 Previous courts have
held that the ratings of corporate bonds by the ratings companies
equated to editorial commentary, which is constitutionally protected
under the First Amendment right of freedom of the press. 98 Under such
protections, in order to recover damages, plaintiffs must demonstrate
that the defendants meet the New York Times v. Sullivan9 9 standard of
"actual malice." While the standard of "actual malice" may be difficult
for RMBS investors to prove, the Second Circuit presented two factors
to consider in determining whether a rating company should receive the
same protections as the traditional press. °° First, according to the Sec-
ond Circuit, courts should consider whether ratings companies are only
"reporting on" the transactions for which they were hired.'O If so, the





96. Tomoeh Murakami Tse & Carrie Johnson, Mortgage Mess Unleashes Chain of Lawsuits,
WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2007, at D I, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/09/10/AR2007091002327.htm (quoting Columbia Law School Professor John C.
Coffee, "Credit-rating agencies have never been held liable in any class-action suit since the
beginning of time. They have had virtual legal immunity to any kind of statement."). For example,
the ratings agencies did not downgrade Enron or its debt until four days prior to Enron's
bankruptcy filing, but they were neither targeted nor held liable in the class action lawsuit that
followed. Id.
97. See, e.g., County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 155 (C.D. Cal. 1999); In
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation, 511 F. Supp. 2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
98. County of Orange, 245 B.R. at 154-55; In re Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d at 822.
99. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
100. See Am. Sav. Bank, FSB v. UBS PaineWebber (In re Fitch, Inc.), 330 F.3d 104, 109-11
(2d Cir. 2003). While the court does not directly discuss whether the ratings.companies should
have First Amendment protections directly, the court analyzes whether the lower court abused its
discretion in not applying the New York Press Shield Law to the ratings.companies as members of
the press. Id.
101. Id. at 109.
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Second Circuit stated the limited scope of the ratings "weighs against"
allowing the agencies to claim the legal protections of a journalist. °2
Second, the court in In re Fitch, Inc. stated that the ratings agency's
active participation in structuring the transactions it subsequently rates
likely went beyond journalism. 10 3 In light of In re Fitch, Inc., investors
of RMBS securities may successfully sustain claims against the ratings
agencies by similarly demonstrating that ratings of RMBS securities
should not be considered mere journalism.
If no longer found to have First Amendment protection, the ratings
companies can point to the fact that they have no direct privity of con-
tract with the investors to attempt to avoid liability. 0 4 The ratings com-
panies are engaged by and compensated by the companies wishing to
package and sell the securities.'05 Investors do not have the capabilities
or the resources to independently research and analyze all of the compa-
nies and securities to adequately determine their risk and value com-
pared to other securities. 10 6 As a result, investors usually will not
purchase any securities that have not been rated by one of the major
ratings companies like Standard and Poor's, Fitch, or Moody's. 10 7 The
companies that wish to sell their securities to the larger market and
intend to generate the most income for their sale are compelled by mar-
ket demand to hire the rating companies to rate the securities.' 0 8 As a
result, the privity of contract for the rating of the security is between the
ratings companies and the companies that initially sell the securities. 09
To further their legal defenses, the ratings companies may point to
an unforeseeable change in the real estate market conditions, which
resulted in the losses to investors. Under this argument, the ratings com-
panies can point to the sudden change in the real estate market and the
market's subsequent meltdown as unforeseeable market events. As such,
the ratings companies can argue that they should not be held liable for
events that could not have been foreseen. Therefore, their ratings of the
RMBS were accurate considering all of the foreseeable risks in the mar-
ket. Thus, the losses suffered by investors were the result of an assumed
risk by the investors for unforeseeable market events.
In addition to the legal arguments, the ratings companies could also
102. Id.
103. Id. at 110- 11.
104. Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial
Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1688 (2008).
105. Id.
106. Engel & McCoy, supra note 39 at 2068.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Kettering, supra note 104 at 1680.
1190 [Vol. 63:1177
ROUGH WATERS FOR THE RATINGS COMPANIES
introduce some policy arguments against holding them liable for the
losses of investors in RMBS. The ratings companies could argue that
they provide an integral service to market investors in rating the securi-
ties and companies.110 As noted above, investors do not have the
resources to research and evaluate all of the companies and securities
that are currently rated. The ratings companies could argue that if they
were held liable for investors' losses, many ratings companies may not
be able to pay the damages and therefore would no longer rate compa-
nies or their securities. The companies that survive could be hesitant to
continue to rate companies in light of the new legal liability. Therefore
they may choose to rate only a small percentage of the companies and
securities that are rated as of today. The absence of the ratings would
likely upset the bond and security market and lead to further disruption
of the overall credit market.' Without the ratings, investors will either
have to choose investments based on insufficient or expensive data, or
more likely, seek other types of investments. This scenario would lead to
information inequality which, in a market system, could lead to large
gains by the few who have the resources and losses by those who do not
possess the resources to accurately assess the risk of the securities or the
companies. Should the market demand for the securities and bonds dis-
appear due to the lack of the ratings, major companies and employers
could face serious cash flow and expansion challenges, the effects of
which could be felt in the overall national as well as global economies.
B. Possible Recovery for the Investors by Analogizing to the
Restatement's View of Promissory Estoppel
Despite many of the arguments ratings companies could assert
against liability, investors have compelling arguments and counterargu-
ments as to why ratings companies should be held liable. Under classic
contract theory, the investors of RMBS could try to seek damages from
the ratings companies under the theory of promissory estoppel, Section
90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts." 2 Although the investors do
not have a direct contractual relationship with the ratings companies,
courts have held that third parties are entitled to relief under the doctrine
of promissory estoppel." 3 Thus, the facts present in the situation with
110. See Kettering, supra note 104 pp. 1671-1680 (discussing the role of ratings.companies in
the securitization market becoming "too big to fail").
111. See id.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
113. At. Masonry v. Miller Constr., 558 So. 2d 433, 434-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that relief to third parties can be granted under promissory estoppel); Flattery v. Gregory,
489 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Mass. 1986) (holding that an injured driver was an intended beneficiary
of an alleged agreement between the insured and the insured's agent); Raritan River Steel Co. v.
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investors of RMBS and the ratings companies may create a situation that
could meet the necessary requirements of Section 90 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts which states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise. 1" 4
In this situation, the investors of RMBS, who have no direct agree-
ment or interaction with the ratings companies, would argue that they
qualify under Section 90 as third parties. 1 5 The investors' reliance on
the ratings of the RMBS was a reasonably foreseeable result of the
action taken by the ratings companies in rating the securities.' 16 Addi-
tionally, the investors will argue that the ratings companies in issuing
and maintaining the rating of the RMBS, did so with the intention that
investors would rely on the ratings and purchase the securities with the
underlying risk of default being designated by the securities' ratings.
Therefore, the ratings companies could reasonably foresee that their rat-
ings would induce investors to purchase RMBS in reliance on the
ratings.
The investors could point to several factors to establish that the
ratings companies could reasonably foresee their reliance. First, the rat-
ings companies have been providing this service to investors for over
sixty years." 7 Additionally the ratings companies' activities are moni-
tored by the SEC, an agency of the United States government. Further-
more the SEC has designated only a select, limited number of
companies, called Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organiza-
tion (or "NRSROs"), to issue securities ratings." 8 Furthermore, under
the $20 billion Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) pro-
gram established in late 2008 to stimulate the credit markets, the govern-
ment would only provide funds collateralized by asset-backed securities
that have been rated among the highest investment by two or more
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 398 S.E.2d 889, 891 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing the seller of steel
to sue the accountants of a bankrupt steel purchaser), rev'd, 407 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. 1991); Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (holding it would be unjust to not hold
defendant liable to third-party plaintiff).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 90 (1981) (emphasis added).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Cox Testimony, supra note 93.
118. Notably, the 2006 SEC amendment to the 1934 Act clearly states that a.company's
distinction as a NRSRO does not waive any rights, privileges, or defenses to the.company under
federal or state law. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(l) (2006). However, the theory presented in this note
does not require a waiver of right or defense in order to hold the ratings companies liable to
investors. Instead the company's designation as a NRSRO by the SEC supports the argument that
reliance on the RMBS ratings was not only foreseeable, but also reasonable.
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NRSROs. 19 Ironically, billions of dollars of RMBS securities would
have theoretically met the government's requirements prior to the mort-
gage crisis that ultimately created the need for the TALF program.
20
With the seeming support from the United States government and the
long history of the ratings companies, the investors' reliance on the rat-
ings companies' ratings would seem reasonable.
In contrast, the ratings companies will argue that the disclaimers
they issue, warning investors not to rely exclusively on the ratings, pro-
tect them from liability under Section 311 of the Second Restatement of
Contracts.12' The Restatement provides, in relevant part:
Discharge or modification of a duty to an intended beneficiary by
conduct of the promisee ... is ineffective if a term of the promise
creating the duty so provides. In the absence of such a term, the
promisor and promisee retain power to discharge or modify the duty
by subsequent agreement. Such a power terminates when the benefi-
ciary, before he receives notification of the discharge or modification,
materially changes his position in justifiable reliance on the promise
or brings suit on it or manifests assent to it at the request of the prom-
isor or promisee.1
21
The ratings companies will maintain that, under Section 311, the
disclaimers discharged their duty to investors who relied on the ratings,
because the investors were properly notified in advance of their purchase
of the securities, as the disclaimers were issued contemporaneously with
the RMBS ratings.'23 However, as discussed above, the main purpose of
the ratings companies is founded and created by the investors' reliance
on those ratings when making their investment decisions. 124 The courts
have repeatedly held that companies' disclaimers do not absolve compa-
nies of liability in cases in which they would otherwise be held liable
under the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing. 25 The courts' rationale
in these cases is that the disclaimer, if upheld, would frustrate the pur-
119. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Reserve Announces the
Creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (Nov. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/monetary20081125a 1 .pdf.
120. See id.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981).
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., id.; see also discussion supra pp. 13-14, 22-24.
125. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(rejecting disclaimer under principles of good faith and fair dealing); TunkI v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963) (same); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161
A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960) (same); Worley v. Wyo. Bottling Co., I P.3d 615, 626-27 (Wyo. 2000)
(rejecting disclaimer in an at-will employment context due to good faith and fair dealing
considerations).
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pose of the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in contracts. 2 6 Simi-
larly, this would hold true if the ratings companies' disclaimers were to
absolve the companies of any legal liability to investors, whose reliance
on the ratings was otherwise found to be reasonable and foreseeable.
27
Further, in addition to demonstrating reasonably foreseeable reli-
ance, the investors will be challenged to demonstrate that the actions of
the ratings companies induced them into purchasing the RMBS.' 28 To
sustain a successful claim under Section 90, the investors must show
that the main reason the issuing companies contracted with the ratings
companies to issue and maintain the risk ratings was to attain a risk
rating that would meet investment quality. 2 9 This, in turn, induced
investors to purchase the RMBS. To support their claim, the investors
will argue the reason the issuing companies paid for the ratings was to
generate a belief that initial and subsequent investors would be able to
rely on the ratings in determining whether or not to purchase the securi-
ties or invest in a similar investment vehicle. 3 ° The issuing companies
benefited from higher securities ratings because the higher a security
was rated, the lower the perceived default risk. Issuers with higher-rated
securities could then demand a higher price from the market of inves-
tors. 31 This relationship clearly signals that it was the intention of the
companies issuing the securities and the ratings companies that investors
would subsequently rely on the ratings of the securities to determine
their investment value and default risk.' 32 Further, the investors who
purchased the securities benefited from the ratings companies continuing
to maintain and monitor the ratings of the securities, as these investors
could offer to resell the security to subsequent investors, who were fur-
ther expected to rely on the ratings.' 33 In continuingly monitoring their
ratings, rating companies support a larger secondary market for the
securities.' 4 The initial rating benefits the issuer and the initial direct
purchaser of the security.1 35 If ratings companies did not continuingly
monitor their ratings, the investors in the secondary market would likely
126. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 449; Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 447; Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 95;
Worley, I P.3d at 626-27.
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
128. See, e.g., id.
129. This idea of issuers shopping for investment grade ratings from ratings companies is
supported by scholars such as Kettering. Kettering, supra note 104 at 1681. The SEC also noted a
concern with the management of the conflict of interests between ratings.companies and issuers.
SEC Ratings Agency Report, infra note 181 at 23-26.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
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lack the confidence in the initial rating and be hesitant to purchase a
security with an older initial rating.'36 Without the secondary markets'
willingness to invest in securities, the market price of the initial securi-
ties would be adversely affected. The initial purchasers would have a
less liquid investment. 3 This would decrease the demand for the secur-
ities because initial investors would have difficulty reselling the securi-
ties to subsequent investors. The result is a lower initial price for the
initial sale of the security than the price of a security that is continually
monitored. Again, the value of the ratings companies to the companies
who pay for their services is created and supported by the investors who
rely on the accuracy of the ratings. The investors could argue that the
actions and motivations of the RMBS issuers and the ratings companies
satisfied the reasonable foreseeability of reliance and inducement ele-
ments of Section 90 as well as making any purported disclaimers of
liability ineffective.' 38
To satisfy the final element of Section 90, the investors must
demonstrate that the remedy of receiving damages for their losses is nec-
essary to avoid injustice. 39 The necessity of proof of injustice may
effectively limit overextension of this doctrine and reserve liability to
only those cases in which real issues have arisen, such as the predatory
lending cases. 4 ° In such cases, persons of limited or fixed income find
themselves with subprime mortgages, which swallow up nearly all of
their monthly income. 4' These "predatory lending practice" cases could
be discouraged by decreasing the supply side. For instance, if the moti-
vation to engage in predatory lending practice is undermined by the
threat that such cases would be facially indefensible should they sour,
the investors would have obvious cases because they relied upon the
third-party recommendation of designated RMBS issuers and ratings
companies in approving such risks.' 4 2 The investors could seek justice
by attempting to recover damages from ratings companies and/or issu-
ers, under traditional Restatement principles, upon a showing that inves-
tors lost money on the overrepresentation of such risks and that such
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
139. Id.
140. See id.; see also Predatory Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 18-19
(2001) (statement of Mrs. Mary Ann Podelco) (testifying about an incident where she was on
fixed i.come, had her house paid off, and was solicited by a mortgage company to finance home
improvements for a payment that amounted to more than half of her fixed i.come, which was
$458; as a result, she lost her home) [hereinafter Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing].
141. See Predatory Mortgage Lending Hearing, supra note 140.
142. See, e.g., id.
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overselling resulted in investor lOSS. 14 3
C. Potential Liability by Extension of Tort Law to
RMBS Ratings Companies
Investors may also attempt to argue for extension of the tort laws to
their claims against RMBS ratings companies. If so, then the standards
that may be applied would be similar, by analogy, to third party audi-
tors' liability to non-clients. Here, the RMBS ratings companies and the
independent auditor are similar in function. Both the third-party auditor
and RMBS ratings companies are thought to be independent.' 44 In fact, a
credit-rating agency that attempts to compete in the industry must first
apply with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 45 In doing
so, the credit-rating agency must make certain disclosures as part of the
application process, designed to reveal any potential issues associated
with its credibility, confidentiality of non-public information, and con-
flicts of interest. 146 Pursuant to statutory mandate, rules have been
implemented to ensure that should the credit-rating agency become a
NRSRO, all conflicts of interest are known and no impermissible con-
flicts of interest exist.
147
Additionally, the expertise and opinion of these independent par-
ties- the auditor and the credit ratings companies-are all equally valu-
able to investors in the financial world. As such, just as auditors have
not always been able to shirk responsibility for their negligence in over-
selling or over-valuating companies when their reports are relied upon
by non-clients, the RMBS credit ratings companies should similarly not
be allowed to escape liability by simply arguing that they lack privity
with those who would rely so heavily upon their opinions. Courts typi-
cally apply three standards to accountants in negligent misrepresentation
cases when, as here, privity probably would not be held to exist. They
are: (1) the reasonable foreseeability rule, (2) the restatement rule, which
applies to parties known to rely upon an accountant's advice, and (3)
near privity.
Under the reasonable foreseeability rule, auditors have been held
liable to parties with whom they lack privity in some jurisdictions.
14 8
Where auditors could reasonably foresee that their statements would be
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).




148. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Commerical Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 321-22
(Miss. 1987); Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (N.J.1983), (overruled by legislative
enactment after New Jersey enacted it's accountant privity statute in 1998, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
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relied upon by third parties with whom they lack privity, the New Jersey
Supreme Court declined to let them avoid liability in Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler. 4 9 In Rosenblum, the issue of what duty, if any, an auditor might
owe to a third party without privity was extended to provide that audi-
tors have a duty to anyone who the auditor should reasonably foresee to
rely upon his statements and opinions, so long as the third party obtained
the statement directly from the auditor and relied upon it for a proper
business purpose. 5 '
In this case, the reasonable foreseeability rule has both positive and
negative aspects in applying it to impose liability on the rating compa-
nies. On the positive side, the ratings companies prepare reports for an
express group of people to rely upon it for business purposes. 151 Further-
more, the statutory and regulatory hurdles imposed by the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission provide built-in rules to prevent any
conflicts of interest on the part of the RMBS issuers and rating compa-
nies. Thus, the reports are necessarily prepared and relied upon for
proper business purposes.152 Further, there is only a narrow use for such
ratings; therefore, the pool of plaintiffs is both limited and reasonably
foreseeable. However, it should be noted that this would extend the rea-
sonable foreseeability rule beyond a strict reading of Rosenblum,
because accountant liability was cut-off to only those third parties who
actually received statements from the auditor. 153 If someone had
received it from another market source or even acquired an auditor state-
ment on the internet or at the library, liability would not apply even if it
was for a proper business purpose and was embarrassingly, but uninten-
tionally wrong. 
154
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, if anything, is
more amenable to possible liability of the rating agencies than the rea-
sonable foreseeability rule, because it is not as limited in that it would
allow plaintiffs who were foreseeable but did not receive their state-
ments directly from accountants.1 55 Section 552 provides, in relevant
2A:53A-25 (1998)); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W. 2d 361, 386 (Wis.
1983).
149. 461 A.2d 138, 152 (N.J. 1983).
150. Id. at 153.
151. Sirri, Sept.2007 Congr. Testimony, surpa note 24; Sirri, Remarks Before AICPAIFMD,
supra note 24.
152. See Rosenblum, Inc., 461 A.2d at 153; see also Siri, Sept.2007 Congr. Testimony, surpa
note 24; Sirri, Remarks Before AICPA/FMD, supra note 24.
153. See Rosenblum, Inc., 461 A.2d at 153.
154. Denzel Causey, Accountants' Liability in an Indeterminate Amount for an Indeterminate
Class: An Analysis of Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 57 Miss.
L.J. 379, 380 (1987). See Rosenblum, Inc., 461 A.2d at 153;
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
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part:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others (1) One
who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transac-
tions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their
justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise rea-
sonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the infor-
mation. (2)The liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss
suffered (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance
upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or
knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction. 1
56
Thus, under Section 552, an accountant would be liable for incorrect
financial statements, audits or reports, as long as they were actually
relied upon by plaintiffs who were foreseeable and part of limited
class. 1 57 Thus, an accountant who prepares financial reports for a client
owes a duty not only to the client but to any other person who is part of
a limited group of persons whom the accountant knows will ultimately
receive and rely upon it regardless of whether the financial reports came
directly from the accountant or were forwarded from the client.15 8 Next,
the issue is whether or not the person that receives the financial materi-
als relies upon them in a transaction that the accountant intends the
information to influence or one that is substantially similar to that trans-
action.' 59 Finally, a person would have to show their individual loss as a
result of that reliance. 60 If so, then an individual would have a claim
against the accountant for negligent misrepresentation.' 6 '






161. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (expanding the duty
in the negligent misrepresentation context to specifically include foreseen or known users in
accounting cases); Raritan River Steel v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609, 614-18 (N.C. 1988) (applying
section 552 of the Restatement in the accounting context to require only that the accountant be
aware at the time he prepares his report that his work product will be relied upon by another
person or a limited class of persons). Whether an accountant is told this directly by his client or if
he learns this through other means does not control. Id. at 618-619; Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Ernst
& Young, 677 So.2d 409, 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that under Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 552, an accountant need not know exactly who is relying on his work
product to be liable for negligent misrepresentation, only that the person be part of a class of
people that the accountant is actually aware that will rely on his financial statements).
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misrepresentation cases in accounting cases to those involving the sub-
prime market would seem especially appealing. Like accountants, the
ratings companies would be liable for their financial analysis to those
people that: (1) specifically request and pay for it; or (2) that they know
will rely upon it by the person specifically requesting and paying for it
or is within an limited group of persons whose reliance on their analysis
is foreseeable. 6 2 The ratings companies prepare reports for a specific
group of investors for a specific purpose. 6 3 Moreover, the number of
participants in the credit rating agency markets is limited by federal leg-
islation.' 64 Thus, the pool of individuals which investors can rely is lim-
ited, just as the market itself is limited.'65 In this context, the rating
companies should foresee that their ratings will be relied upon by the
investors in this market and should they make negligent financial mis-
representations, liability must result. 66 Thus, under this model, investors
in the subprime market could sue a rating company that negligently
inflated their security ratings, if they can show reliance upon that infor-
mation to their financial detriment.
The third basis for tort liability to the rating companies is the near
privity rule, which is closely related to the concept of privity and, conse-
quently, more narrow than the approach to negligent misrepresentation
take by Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, or even the
reasonable foreseeability rule. As alluded to earlier, many states require
strict privity to impose liability on accountants for negligent misrepre-
sentation.' 67 However, as circumstances have evolved, the strict privity
rule has been eroded to a more fluid concept, which is able to reach
injustices that the privity rule does not. For example, the New York
Court of Appeals in a 1985 case, Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen &
Co.,' 68 applied near privity in the accounting context by clarifying its
near privity rule with a three-prong test.169 Under the Credit Alliance
test, a person seeking to impose liability on an auditor must show: (1)
that the accountant knew his or her financial statements were going to be
used for a specific purpose or for a set of limited, specific purposes; (2)
that the accountant knew that certain parties would rely on his state-
ments in furtherance of those purposes; and (3) that the accountant was
familiar enough with the third party through his or her affirmative con-





167. See, e.g., Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 634 (Va. 1993) (requiring strict
privity); Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919) (establishing strict privity).
168. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
169. Id. at 118.
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duct that it is clear that the accountant knew of the plaintiff's potential
reliance on his financial statements.t
70
Applying this rule by analogy to investors hit in the credit
meltdown, there would be little hope for an investor who lost money
because of the misdeeds of the rating companies. First, the investor
would have to show that the rating companies knew that their AAA
ratings would be used for a specific purpose or set of specific pur-
poses. 17 At first blush, that would seem fairly obvious as the RMBS
market and the use of those ratings in that market is well-known and
regulated.1 72 Second, the investor would have to show that the rating
companies knew that certain parties would rely upon the credit ratings
for limited, specific purposes. 173 This too would seem fairly straightfor-
ward as the credit ratings are used for specific purposes in securitization
and investment in securitization. The third test, however, would be fatal
if not adapted to fit the RMBS market. 74 There, the investor would have
to express through his or her conduct that the rating company knew the
investor, such that it is clear that they were aware of his potential reli-
ance on the credit ratings.17 5 Although one could imagine situations
where perhaps this would apply, in the usual case it would not. It would
essentially require substantial evidence of conduct showing that there
was a relationship between the investor/plaintiff and the rating company
that was not quite enough to establish privity, but far too inflexible to
rescue most investors from the sub prime mortgage meltdown. Thus,
only by modifying this test to meet the realities of the market could this
test be useful in providing potential liability to investors.
Finally there has been a recent movement among legal scholars to
attempt to extend the doctrine of defective products liability to intangi-
ble consumer credit products. 7 6 These arguments are being developed
to expand the defective products liability doctrine in order to protect
consumers by holding the issuers of consumer credit products strictly






175. See id.; see also Bank v. Strauhs & Kay, 483 N.E.2d 110, 120 (N.Y. 1985) (satisfying the
conduct requirement in the near privity test by proffering evidence of direct communications,
including written and oral conversations, along with a series of personal meetings with the
accountant).
176. See Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(2008); Adam Goldstein, Why "It Pays" to "Leave Home Without It": Examining the Legal
Culpability of Credit Card Issuers Under Tort Principles of Products Liability, note, 2006 U. ILL.
L. REv. 827 (2006).
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bility under simple negligence doctrine.'77 If the courts accept these
arguments and expand strict products liability standards to include
RMBS ratings, investors will only need to prove that the ratings of the
RMBS themselves are: (1) intangible products which should be analyzed
similar to other tangible products, (2) defective at the time they were
issued, (3) the investors were foreseeable third party users, and (4)
harmed by the defective products. 78
First the investors will need to demonstrate that the ratings were in
fact intangible products issued by the ratings companies. The ratings
companies will likely attempt to use previously stated arguments that the
ratings are not in fact products, but rather editorial reporting protected
by the First Amendment or mere puffery not to be relied upon.' 7 9 As
stated, the nature of the ratings of RMBS securities likely surpasses edi-
torial journalism, and thus, under the analysis of In re Fitch, should not
be afforded First Amendment Protection.8 0 Additionally, considering
the amount of information and analysis the ratings companies claim to
use in determining the ratings, coupled with the amount of money the
companies make generating the ratings, the claim that the ratings are
mere puffery rather than actual products is untenable. In fact, in order to
maintain the NRSRO rating with the government, the agencies are
"required to produce credit ratings with integrity" or risk losing their
valuable distinction as NRSROs. 8 ' The language of the NRSRO Guide-
lines indicates the ratings provided by the agencies are viewed by the
government as quantifiable products of importance rather than mere
puffery or editorial commentary. 8 '
Next, the investors, to obtain strict liability under the doctrine of
177. See Bar-Gill and Warren, supra note 176; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
178. Id. The manufacturing defect was chosen over design defect in this example because it is
the author's view that a court might more readily apply manufacturing defect products liability
principles in finding that the failure of RMBS ratings were a result of insufficient modeling or
poor analysis by the ratings agencies rather than ruling that design of the ratings themselves is
defective. The court may rule that the designs of the ratings are defective, but such a ruling could
be a death blow to the future of credit ratings. The ratings, when accurately issued, are vital to the
credit markets and for over sixty years served a useful purpose to the credit markets. Furthermore,
plaintiffs will not be charged under manufacturing defect, as they would with design defects, to
provide the court an alternative product design.
179. See discussion supra pp. 18-19.
180. See Id.; see also, In re Fitch, Inc., supra note 100.
181. Staff Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations Division of Trading and
Markets and Economic Analysis, Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staffs
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies, Securities Exchange Commission at 22 (July
2008)[hereinafter SEC Ratings Agency Report] available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2008/craexamination0708O8.pdf.
182. See id.; see also discussion of ratings companies' claims of First Amendment protection
supra pp. 18-19.
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manufacturer's defect, must show that the rating product was defective
at the time it was issued. 8 3 To prove this, investors will initially direct
the courts' attention to grossly understated ratings of default risk of
RMBS. In response, ratings companies will argue that the real estate
meltdown and its severity was an unforeseeable event. Thus, the ratings
company will argue RMBS ratings products were not defective merely
because they grossly underestimated default risk at the time they were
issued, but rather, they were just another casualty of unforeseeable mar-
ket events. However, investors could again point to warnings and market
conditions that were essentially ignored by the ratings companies.' 84
Furthermore, a July 2008 SEC investigation found several issues of con-
cern with the ratings companies' practices in issuing RMBS ratings.'85
Investors could use the findings of the SEC investigation to demonstrate
that the RMBS ratings were defectively issued for a variety of reasons.
First, the SEC found that the agencies were severely understaffed in
order to meet the volume of the ratings they issued at the peak of the
market.' 86 As a result, the investors could argue risk analysis of the
RMBS were incomplete or rushed, creating the defective rating prod-
ucts."S7 Second the SEC identified concerns regarding the inherent con-
flict of interests between the ratings agencies and the clients from which
they hoped to continue to generate business.' 88 The SEC in its report
noted that such conflicts could impair the integrity of the ratings.
189
Third, both Moody's and S&P acknowledged the existence of computer
glitches that may have lead to inaccurately high ratings. 9 ' Finally, the
SEC report referenced internal emails from employees of ratings agen-
cies indicating a lack of good faith belief in the RMBS ratings.' 9 ' One
particularly troubling e-mail expressed concerns that RMBS ratings
models did not capture "half' of the risk of a particular transaction, but
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
184. See Statement on Subprime Lending, supra note 79.
185. SEC Ratings Agency Report, supra note 181. Some of the issues discussed in the SEC
report were: (1) the ratings companies inability to adjust to the growth in RMBS rating demand,
(2) the lack of disclosure in the ratings process, (3) lack of documentation of the policy and
procedures of RMBS ratings, including instances where the companies deviated from their own
models in issuing ratings, (4) the surveillance process or the process where the ratings were
monitored were less thorough than the initial rating process, and (5) the lack of proper
management of the conflict of interests between the ratings.companies and the issuing.companies.
Id.
186. Id. at 12.
187. See id. at 12.
188. Id. at 23.
189. Id. at 23.
190. Id. at 23.
191. Id. at 12.
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"it could be structured by cows and we would rate it.', 9 2 Another e-mail
from a manager at a ratings agency referred to the RMBS market as a
"monster" and said, "Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the
time this house of cards falters." '193 Investors could proffer these SEC
findings to show that the RMBS ratings were produced by the employ-
ees in a manner that made the RMBS ratings defective.
After demonstrating the RMBS ratings were defectively made, the
investors must next show that they were foreseeable third party users
harmed by the product. Again, the investors are ultimately the reason
why issuers paid for the ratings agency to rate the RMBS securities.1 94
The investors used the ratings products in order to determine the price
they were willing to buy or sell the security and underlying risk of the
RMBS securities. 195 Also the ratings product helped guide the price
investors would pay to buy or sell the securities.196 With the catastrophic
failure of the ratings of RMBS, billions of dollars were lost by investors
who relied on the ratings products. Considering the harm caused to both
investors and the economy as a result of the defectively rated RMBS
ratings, courts could reasonably determine the RMBS ratings were
harmful defective products. Should the courts decide to extend the doc-
trine of manufacturing defect to RMBS ratings, ratings companies could
be held strictly liable for their RMBS ratings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Financial institutions are not stagnant and injustice will occur if our
legal system cannot adapt itself to meet the economic realities, such as
those that led to the current real estate meltdown. This note examined
the problem of the implosion of RMBS securities and the events leading
up to it with an eye toward fashioning a speculative remedy to provide
for justice. Unfortunately, our legal system currently does not have any
law directly applicable to handle the situation and the state and Federal
response to the crisis has provided mixed, albeit, limited success. By
applying standards of contract theory such as promissory estoppel and
tort theories of negligence and products liability to these security ratings
companies, investors may be left with some recourse.
Extending liability to ratings companies is not, however, without
unintended consequences. First, the ratings companies could not survive
if they were held liable for all RMBS investor losses. The ratings com-
192. Id. at 12.
193. Id. at 12.
194. See discussion supra pp. 13-14, 22-24.
195. See discussion supra pp. 13-14.
196. See id.
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panies play an essential role to the credit markets and their sudden col-
lapse could disrupt the world economy.1 97 This raises the issue of how
far should the courts extend the liability to the ratings companies. Ideally
the liability to ratings companies should not extend to the entire RMBS
market. Doing so would essentially cause the ratings companies to be
the unknowing guarantors to the RMBS market. This would go too far to
prevent injustice. Also, even with some limits to the scope of liability to
the ratings companies, the cost of corporate credit would become more
expensive. The potential future liability would decrease the number of
companies willing to issue ratings and act as a barrier to entry for
smaller companies. Ratings companies that survive would likely
increase the cost of their products to offset some of the liability risk and
capitalize on the decreased competition. The increased costs of corporate
credit as a result of the ratings companies' liability could adversely
effect the economy.
Nonetheless, justice would not be served by allowing to the ratings
companies to continue to avoid liability solely based on the potential
unintended consequences. Ratings companies presented themselves as
impartial third parties providing useful ratings products that reflect the
default risk of the underlying investment. Over the past sixty years the
ratings companies have in fact provided a valuable, and usually reliable,
service to the credit markets. With the expansion into the market of sub-
prime RMBS ratings, the ratings companies seemed to abandon their
principles and controls upon which their reputation and credibility was
established. As a result, investors who relied on the RMBS ratings suf-
fered greater losses and the credit market as a whole was adversely
effected. By maintaining liability for RMBS ratings, the ratings compa-
nies will perhaps be motivated to use more care in issuing their ratings
in the future, an oft cited motivation for the imposition of tort liability.
Furthermore, holding ratings companies accountable for improper credit
ratings could restore investor confidence and help stimulate the weak-
ened credit markets and the economy. Ideally expanding liability to rat-
ings companies now will provide more stability to the credit markets and
hopefully prevent unnecessary losses in the future.
197. See discussion supra pp. 21-22; see also Kettering, supra note 104 at 1671-80.
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